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Herd Behavior in Financial Markets
SUSHIL BIKHCHANDANI and SUNIL SHARMA*
This paper provides an overview of the recent theoretical and empirical
research on herd behavior in financial markets. It looks at what precisely is
meant by herding, the causes of herd behavior, the success of existing studies
in identifying the phenomenon, and the effect that herding has on financial
markets. [JEL G1, G2, F4]
“Men, it has been well said, think in herds; it will be seen that
they go mad in herds, while they only recover their senses slowly,
and one by one.” 
Charles Mackay (1841)
I
n the aftermath of several widespread financial crises, “herd” has again
become a pejorative term in the financial lexicon. Investors and fund managers
are portrayed as herds that charge into risky ventures without adequate informa-
tion and appreciation of the risk-reward trade-offs and, at the first sign of
trouble, flee to safer havens. Some observers express concern that herding by
market participants exacerbates volatility, destabilizes markets, and increases
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the fragility of the financial system.1 This raises questions about why it is
surprising that profit-maximizing investors, increasingly with similar information
sets, react similarly at more or less the same time? And is such behavior part of
market discipline in relatively transparent markets, or is it due to other factors?
For an investor to imitate others, she must be aware of and be influenced by
others’ actions. Intuitively, an individual can be said to herd if she would have
made an investment without knowing other investors’ decisions, but does not
make that investment when she finds that others have decided not to do so.
Alternatively, she herds when knowledge that others are investing changes her
decision from not investing to making the investment.
There are several reasons for a profit/utility-maximizing investor to be influ-
enced into reversing a planned decision after observing others. First, others may
know something about the return on the investment and their actions reveal this
information. Second, and this is relevant only for money managers who invest on
behalf of others, the incentives provided by the compensation scheme and terms
of employment may be such that imitation is rewarded. A third reason for imita-
tion is that individuals may have an intrinsic preference for conformity.2
When investors are influenced by others’ decisions, they may herd on an
investment decision that is wrong for all of them. Suppose that 100 investors each
have their own assessments, possibly different, about the profitability of investing
in an emerging market. For concreteness, suppose that 20 of the investors believe
that this investment is worthwhile and the remaining 80 believe that it is not.
Every investor knows only her own estimate of the profitability of this invest-
ment; she does not know the assessments of others’ or which way a majority of
them are leaning. If these investors pooled their knowledge and assessments, they
would collectively decide that investing in the emerging market is not a good idea.
But they do not share their information and assessments with each other.
Moreover, these 100 investors do not take their investment decisions at the same
time. Suppose that the first few investors who decide are among the 20 optimistic
investors and they make a decision to enter the emerging market. Then several of
the 80 pessimistic investors may revise their beliefs and also decide to invest.
This, in turn, could have a snowballing effect, and lead to most of the 100 indi-
viduals investing in the emerging market. Later, when the unprofitability of the
decision becomes clear, these investors exit the market.
The above example illustrates several aspects of information cascades or
herd behavior arising from informational differences. First, the actions (and the
1See, for example, Morris and Shin (1999), Persaud (2000) and Shiller (1990) for an analysis of how
the interaction of herding and institutional risk management strategies may amplify volatility;
Eichengreen and others (1998) for the role hedge funds may have played in the Asian crisis; Council on
Foreign Relations (1999), Folkerts-Landau and Garber (1999) and Furman and Stiglitz (1999) for a
discussion in the context of the international financial architecture; Eichengreen and others (1998) for a
discussion of herd behavior in the context of capital account liberalization. 
2Externalities due to direct payoff or utility interactions (i.e., externalities by which an agent’s action
affects the utility or the production possibilities of other agents) are not an important cause of herd
behavior in financial markets.  Direct payoff externalities are significant in bank-runs or in the formation
of markets, topics that are outside the scope of this paper. See Diamond and Dybvig (1983) for more on
herd behavior caused by direct payoff externalities.assessments) of investors who decide early may be crucial in determining which way
the majority will decide. Second, the decision that investors herd on may well be
incorrect. Third, if investors take a wrong decision, then with experience and/or the
arrival of new information, they are likely to eventually reverse their decision starting
a herd in the opposite direction. This, in turn, increases volatility in the market.
According to the definition of herd behavior given above, herding results from
an obvious intent by investors to copy the behavior of other investors. This should
be distinguished from “spurious herding” where groups facing similar decision
problems and information sets take similar decisions. Such spurious herding is an
efficient outcome whereas “intentional” herding, as explained in Section I, need
not be efficient. But it needs pointing out that empirically distinguishing “spurious
herding” from “intentional” herding is easier said than done and may even be
impossible, since typically, a multitude of factors have the potential to affect an
investment decision.
Fundamentals-driven spurious herding out of equities could arise if, for
example, interest rates suddenly rise and stocks become less attractive invest-
ments. Investors under the changed circumstances may want to hold a smaller
percentage of stocks in their portfolio. This is not herding according to the defini-
tion above because investors are not reversing their decision after observing
others. Instead, they are reacting to commonly known public information, which
is the rise in interest rates.
Spurious herding may also arise if the opportunity sets of different investors
differ. Suppose there are two groups of investors who invest in a country’s stock
market—domestic (D) and foreign (F) investors. Due to restrictions on capital
account convertibility in this country, type D individuals invest only in Sd, the
domestic stock market, and in Bd, the domestic bond market. Type F individuals
invest in Sd, Bd, and also in Sf, a foreign country’s stock market and Bf, the foreign
bond market. If, in the foreign country, interest rates decrease or there is greater
pessimism regarding firms’earning expectations, then type F investors may increase
the share of Sd and Bd in their portfolio, buying both from type D investors.
Consequently, in the domestic markets Sd and Bd, type F investors appear to be part
of a buying “herd” whereas type D investors appear to be part of a selling “herd.”
However, the investment decisions of types F and D investors are individual deci-
sions and may not be influenced by others’actions. Moreover, this behavior is effi-
cient under the capital convertibility constraints imposed on type D investors.
Other causes of intentional herding include behavior that is not fully rational
(and Bayesian). Recent papers on this topic include DeLong, Shleifer, Summers,
and Waldman (1990); Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1992); and Lux and Marchesi
(1999).3 In this review, we do not discuss models of herd behavior by individuals
who are not fully rational except to note that one type of herd behavior—use of
momentum-investment strategies—has been documented in the literature (see, for
example, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1995); Froot and others (2001); Choe
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3See Shleifer and Summers (1990) for an exposition of the noise trader approach to finance. This
approach rests on two assumptions: (i) some of the investors are not fully rational  (the noise traders), and
(ii) arbitrage is risky and hence limited.and others (1999); Kim and Wei (1999a, 1999b)). A momentum-investment
strategy is the tendency of an investor to buy and sell stocks based on past returns
of the stocks, that is, to buy recent winners and sell recent losers. This form of herd
behavior is not rational under the efficient-markets hypothesis since market prices
are assumed to reflect all available information. Such “momentum-investment” or
“positive-feedback” strategies can exacerbate price movements and add to
volatility. Of course, one could argue that it takes time for market participants to
completely digest and act on new information and hence market prices fully incor-
porate new information only over time. If this is the case, then positive-feedback
strategies may be rational and participants who follow such strategies can be seen
as exploiting the persistence of returns over some time period.4
In this paper we provide an overview of the recent theoretical and empirical
research on rational herd behavior in financial markets. Specifically, we examine
what precisely is meant by herding, what are possible causes of rational herd
behavior, what success existing studies have had in identifying it, and what effect
such behavior has on financial markets.5 In Section I, we discuss how imperfect
information, concern for reputation, and compensation structures can cause
herding. 
Intentional herding may be inefficient and is usually characterized by fragility
and idiosyncrasy. It can lead to excess volatility and systemic risk.6 Therefore, it
is important to distinguish between true (intentional) and spurious (unintentional)
herding. Furthermore, the causes of investor herding are crucial for determining
policy responses for mitigating herd behavior. How does one empirically distin-
guish between informational, reputation-based, and compensation-based herding?
One approach would be to examine whether the assumptions underlying some of
the theories of herd behavior are satisfied.
A financial asset bought by one market player must be sold by another.
Therefore, all market participants cannot be part of a “buying herd” or a “selling
herd.” To examine herd behavior, one needs to find a group of participants that
trade actively and act similarly. Such a group is more likely to herd if it is suffi-
ciently homogenous (each member faces a similar decision problem), and each
member can observe the trades of other members of the group. Also, such a
homogenous group cannot be too large relative to the size of the market because
in a large group (say one that holds 80 percent of the outstanding stock) both
buyers and sellers are likely to be adequately represented.
It is unlikely that investors observe each other’s holdings of an individual
stock soon enough to change their own portfolios.7 There is therefore little
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4For a fascinating interpretation of structural, cultural and psychological factors that may be respon-
sible for recent U.S. stock market valuations, see Shiller (2000). Also, see Flood and Hodrick (1986), West
(1988) and Campbell et al (2000) for a discussion of the empirical literature on asset price volatility. For
a fundamentals based explanation of some famous bubbles, see Garber (2001).  
5See Devenow and Welch (1995) for an earlier survey of theoretical models.
6By this we mean that volatility is likely to be higher compared to market situations in which herd
behavior is not prevalent.
7Of course, there is some information leakage through brokers about the trading patterns of various
funds and investors. And many companies market “snapshots” of quarterly holdings. Still, it is difficult to
get reliable information on daily, weekly or even monthly changes in stock portfolios.possibility of intentional herding at the level of individual stocks. One is more
likely to find herding at the level of investments in a group of stocks (stocks of
firms in an industry or in a country) after the impact of fundamentals has been
factored out.
Manski (2000) provides an accessible survey of the state of empirical research
on social interactions, and the difficulty of drawing inferences about the nature of
an interaction process from observations on its outcomes. He argues that structural
analysis of markets remains a subtle inferential problem and econometric methods
do not—indeed cannot—resolve the basic identification problem. The data
commonly brought to bear to study such interactions has only limited power to
distinguish among alternative plausible hypotheses. Observations on market trans-
actions and their prices can reveal only so much about the factors determining the
choices of market participants. And given the data currently available, analysis of
social interactions requires strong assumptions that diminish the credibility of the
conclusions about behavior. 
One cannot distinguish between different causes of herd behavior directly
from the analysis of a data set on asset holdings and price changes since it is
difficult, if not impossible, to discern the motive behind a trade that is not
driven by “fundamentals.” However, though difficult, it may be possible to
separate out reactions to public information (unintentional herding) by explic-
itly allowing for changes in fundamentals. If after factoring out such effects,
one still finds herding in the data (i.e., a correlation in the positions taken by
different managers), then informational cascades, reputation-based herding, or
the compensation systems for the portfolio managers may be the cause. In the
absence of richer data sets—especially lack of data on the subjective expecta-
tions of market participants—further differentiation among the causes of herd
behavior will prove difficult.
Keeping these issues in mind, we discuss the empirical literature in Section
II. Much of the work does not test the validity of specific models or causes of
herd behavior. The empirical specifications do not naturally arise from the
theoretical models discussed, and generally a purely statistical approach is used
to examine to what extent there is a clustering of decisions, after an attempt has
been made to account for changes in “fundamentals” and publicly available
information. 
I. Causes of Rational Herd Behavior
There are several potential reasons for rational herd behavior in financial markets.
The most important of these are imperfect information, concern for reputation, and
compensation structures.
Information-Based Herding and Cascades
The basic models in Banerjee (1992); Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch
(1992); and Welch (1992) assume that the investment opportunity is available to
all individuals at the same price, that is, the supply is perfectly elastic. This may
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exchange rates. However, these theories are not an adequate model of equity (or
bond) markets where the investment decisions of early individuals are reflected
in the subsequent price of the investment. Later, we discuss how the basic
insights from these models are modified when applied to a model of the stock
market (Avery and Zemsky, 1998).
Suppose that individuals face similar investment decisions under uncer-
tainty and have private (but imperfect) information about the correct course of
action. In the context considered here, an investor’s private information may be
the conclusions of her research effort. Alternatively, all information relevant to
the investment is public but there is uncertainty about the quality of this infor-
mation. For example, has the government doctored the economic data just
released? Is the government really committed to economic reform? An indi-
vidual’s assessment of the quality of publicly available information is only
privately known to her.
Individuals can observe each other’s actions but not the private information
or signals that each player receives. (Even if individuals communicate their
private information to each other, the idea that “actions speak louder than
words” provides justification for this assumption.) If individuals have some
view about the appropriate course of action, then inferences about a player’s
private information can be made from the actions chosen. We show below that
herd behavior may arise in this setting. Moreover, such behavior is fragile, in
that it may break easily with the arrival of a little new information; and it is
idiosyncratic, in that random events combined with the choices of the first few
players determine the type of behavior on which individuals herd. A simple
example illustrates the main ideas.
Suppose that several investors decide in sequence whether to invest in an indi-
vidual stock (or an industry or a country). For each investor, let V denote the
payoff to investing relative to the next best project. V is either +1 or –1 with equal
probability. (The payoff from the next best project is normalized to zero). The
order in which the investors decide is exogenously specified. Each investor
observes a private signal (either a good signal, G, or a bad one, B) about the payoff
of the investment. If V = +1, then the probability that the signal is G is equal to p
and that the signal is B is 1 – p, where 0.5 < p < 1. Similarly, if V = –1 then the
signal realization is B with probability p (G with probability 1 – p). The investors’
signals are independent conditional on the true value. Apart from her own private
signal, each investor observes the decisions (but not the private signals) of her
predecessors.
It is worth noting the following implication of the symmetry of the signals.
Suppose that a total of M good signals and N bad signals are observed. Then
repeated application of Bayes’ rules implies that, if M > N, the posterior distribu-
tion of V is the same as if a total of M – N signals were observed, all of them good.
Alternatively, if M < N, the posterior is same as if a total of N – M signals were
observed, all of them bad. And if M = N then the posterior is the same as the prior,
that is, V is either +1 or –1 with equal probability. This observation makes the
remainder of this section easier to follow. 
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is 
A similar calculation using Bayes’ rule implies that the posterior probability of
V = +1 after observing a B is 
As a result, the first investor, Angela, will follow her signal: if she observes G then
she invests, if she observes B then she does not invest. Bob, the second investor,
knows this and can figure out Angela’s signal from her action. If his signal is G
and he observes Angela invest then he too will invest. If, instead, Bob’s signal is
B and he observes Angela invest, then another application of Bayes’ rule implies
that his posterior probability that V = +1 is 0.5 (it is as if Bob observed two signals,
a G and B); therefore, Bob is indifferent between investing and rejecting and he
flips a coin to decide. Thus, if Angela invests and Bob rejects, then Claire, the third
investor, will infer that Angela saw G and Bob saw B. If instead Angela and Bob
both invest, then Claire will infer that Angela saw G and Bob is more likely to
have seen G than B. The remaining two cases where Angela rejects and Bob either
invests or rejects are symmetric.
Suppose that Angela and Bob both invest. Claire concludes that Angela and
probably also Bob observed good signals. Another application of Bayes’ rule
shows that Claire should always invest regardless of her private information.
Even if Angela’s signal is B, her posterior probability that V = +1 exceeds 0.5.
This is so, because Claire’s B signal and Angela’s G signal (which Claire infers
from Angela’s decision to invest) cancel each other and, Claire reasons, that
since Bob invested he is more likely to have observed G rather than B. Thus,
David, the fourth investor, learns nothing about Claire’s signal realization from
her (rational and optimal) decision to invest. David is in exactly the same posi-
tion that Claire was and he too will invest regardless of his own signal realiza-
tion. And so will Emma, Frank, Greta, Harry, etc. An invest cascade is said to
have started with Claire. Similarly, if Angela and Bob both do not invest then a
reject cascade starts with Claire. 
If, on the other hand, Angela and Bob take opposite actions, then Claire
knows that one of them saw the signal G and the other saw signal B. Her prior
belief (before observing her signal) is that V = +1 and V = –1 are equally likely
and she, being exactly in the position that Angela found herself in, follows her
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Proposition: An individual will be in an “invest cascade” (“reject cascade”) if and
only if the number of predecessors who invest is greater (less) than the number of
predecessors who do not invest by two or more.
To summarize, an invest cascade, say, starts with the first individual who finds
that the number of predecessors who invested exceeds the predecessors who
rejected by two. This individual and all subsequent individuals, acting rationally,
will then invest regardless of what their private signal tells them about the value
of the investment. Once a cascade starts, an individual’s action does not reflect her
private information. Consequently, once a cascade starts, the private information
of subsequent investors is never included in the public pool of knowledge.
The probability that a cascade will start after the first few individuals is very
high. Even if the signal is arbitrarily noisy (i.e., p arbitrarily close to 0.5) a
cascade starts after the first four [eight] individuals with probability greater than
0.93 [0.996]. Especially for noisy signals, the probability that the cascade is
incorrect (i.e., a reject cascade when V = +1 or an invest cascade when V = –1)
is significant. For instance, when p = 0.55 the probability that the eventual
cascade is incorrect is 0.434, which is only slightly less than 0.45, the probability
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Bof an individual taking the incorrect action without the benefit of observing
predecessors.
The private information available to investors, if it were to become public,
would yield a much more accurate forecast of the true value of the investment.
Imagine that all investors are altruistic in that they care as much about other
investors as they do about themselves. For concreteness, suppose that each indi-
vidual’s payoff, instead of being the return on his/her own investment decision, is
the average return on the investment decisions of all individuals. Suppose now
that Angela and Bob both decide to invest, and Claire observes a B signal. Claire
infers that Angela and Bob each observed G.8 If Claire cared only about the return
on her own investment decision then, as argued earlier, she would rationally
ignore her signal and invest (since her posterior probability that V = +1 is p > 0.5).
But an altruistic Claire cares equally about the decisions of all subsequent indi-
viduals and would like them to know of her signal; the only way Claire can
communicate her signal is by rejecting the investment. Hence, she faces a choice
of increasing her payoff (which is the average return on the investment decisions
of all individuals) either (i) by adding to the pool of public knowledge by rejecting
or (ii) by taking the best investment decision based on currently available infor-
mation, that is, by investing. Her decision will be to reject if there are at least two
subsequent individuals and the signals are not exceedingly accurate (i.e., p is not
very close to one). Similarly, if after observing Angela and Bob invest, Claire
observes a G signal then there is no conflict between (i) and (ii) above: investing
communicates her private information and is also the best investment decision
based on her current information. David, and all later individuals, face a similar
choice between conveying information and taking the best current period decision.
Acascade will eventually start under altruistic behavior, but much later, only
after a substantial number of individuals’ private information has been revealed
through their actions. For instance, if there are a hundred individuals and the
second through the tenth individuals altruistically follow their private signals in
taking actions, then much better information is available (when compared with
the selfish-individuals scenario) to the eleventh through the hundredth individ-
uals. Individuals 11 through 100 will tend to herd on a decision, which is much
more likely to be correct than under the selfish-individuals scenario, where a
cascade might start with the third individual. The outcome under altruistic
behavior is efficient in that all private information available is being used Pareto
optimally (within the constraint that individuals cannot observe the private
information of others). Or to put it differently, if selfish individuals were to
follow strategies of altruistic individuals then the sum of payoffs of all (selfish)
individuals would be strictly greater.9
Although the altruistic-individuals scenario is unrealistic, contrasting it to the
selfish-individuals scenario highlights the fact that when an individual takes an
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8After observing Angela invest, Bob will not be indifferent between investing and rejecting if he were
to see the signal B; he would strictly prefer to reject in order to convey his information.  That is, altruistic
Bob always follows his signal.
9Alternatively, a benevolent social planner with the authority to direct each (selfish) individual’s
strategy choices (but without the ability to observe their private signals) could do no better.action that is uninformative to others, it creates a negative externality.10 This infor-
mation or herding externality leads to an inefficient outcome. Like all externali-
ties, the herding externality, too, disappears if individuals internalize the utility
function of others, that is, if individuals are altruistic.
Let us revert back to the original model with a sequence of selfish individuals
who observe their predecessors’actions. In that model, the type of cascade depends
not just on how many good and bad signals arrive, but the order in which they arrive.
For example, if signals arrive in the order GGBB . . . , then all individuals invest
because Claire begins an invest cascade. If, instead, the same set of signals arrive in
the order BBGG . . . , no individual invests because Claire begins a reject cascade.
And if the signals arrive as GBBG, then with probability one-half Bob invests and
Claire begins an invest cascade. Thus, whether individuals on the whole invest or
reject is (a) path-dependent in that it matters whether the first four signal realizations
are GGBB or BBGG and (b) idiosyncratic in that small differences in initial events
can make a big difference to the behavior of a large number of individuals.
If the signals received by predecessors (instead of actions taken) were observ-
able, later decision makers would have almost perfect information about the value
of investing and would tend to take the correct action. The fundamental reason the
outcome with observable actions is so different from the observable-signals bench-
mark is that once a cascade starts, public information stops accumulating. An early
preponderance towards investing or rejecting causes all subsequent individuals to
ignore their private signals, which thus never join the public knowledge pool. Also,
this public knowledge pool does not have to be very informative to cause individ-
uals to disregard their private signals. As soon as the public information becomes
even slightly more informative than the signal of a single participant, individuals
defer to the actions of predecessors and a cascade begins. Consequently, a cascade
is not robust to small shocks. Several possible kinds of shocks could dislodge a
cascade, for example, the arrival of better informed individuals, the release of new
public information, and shifts in the underlying value of investing versus not
investing. Indeed, when participants know that they are in a cascade, they also
know that the cascade is based on little information relative to the information of
private individuals. Thus, a key prediction of the theory is that behavior in cascades
is fragile with respect to small shocks. 
Thus information-based cascades are born quickly, idiosyncratically, and
shatter easily. This conclusion is robust to relaxing many of assumptions in the
example. For instance, Chari and Kehoe (1999) show that information cascades
persist in a model in which the sequence of decision makers is endogenously
determined, the action space instead of being discrete is a continuum, and there is
the possibility of information sharing among investors. Calvo and Mendoza (2000)
investigate a model in which individuals may invest in N different countries. There
is a fixed cost of collecting information about returns to investment in country A.
The payoff to individuals from collecting this information decreases as N, the
Sushil Bikhchandani and Sunil Sharma
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10Observe that this externality is distinct from the direct payoff externality referred to in footnote 3.
The actions of one individual do not change the underlying payoffs of other individuals but they do influ-
ence the beliefs of others.number of countries (investment opportunities), increases. For sufficiently large N,
the number of investors who are informed about country A decreases significantly
and investors herd in their decisions regarding investing in country A. 
Herd behavior is therefore robust to relaxing our assumptions that investors
take decisions in an exogenous linear order and that information acquisition is
costless. Others have shown that herd behavior persists even under imperfect
observability of predecessors’ actions11 or with some heterogeneity among
investors.12 For more on the robustness of informational herding, see
Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1998) and the references therein.
Application to Stock Markets
In the preceding discussion, the price for taking an action is fixed ex ante and
remains so. This assumption is inappropriate for a model of herd behavior in the
stock market, as the investment decisions of early investors are likely to be
reflected in the subsequent price of the asset. The assumption of fixed prices is
relaxed in Avery and Zemsky (1998).13
In the simple framework considered in the previous section, the price of the
investment was normalized to zero and remained fixed throughout. Suppose
instead that after every buy or sell decision by an investor, the price of a stock
adjusts to take into account the information revealed by this decision. (We ignore
bid-ask spreads to simplify the exposition.) In a setting with competitive market-
makers, the stock price will always be the expected value of the investment condi-
tional on all publicly available information. Therefore, an investor who has only
publicly available information (including the actions of predecessors) will be just
indifferent between buying or selling. Further, the action of any privately informed
investor will reveal his or her information. That is, an information cascade never
starts. This is easy to see in the simple example, modified to allow for flexible
prices. Recall that V, the true value of the investment, is either +1 or –1 with equal
probability and investors get a private signal that is correct with probability p,
0.5 < p < 1. The initial price of the investment is 0. If Angela, the first investor,
buys then the stock price increases to 2p – 1, the expected value of the stock price
conditional on Angela observing G. As before, Bob knows that Angela invested
and therefore she must have observed a signal realization G. If Bob’s private
signal realization is B, then his posterior expected value of V is 0, which is less
than 2p – 1, the price of the investment. If, instead, Bob observes G then his poste-
rior expected value of V is [2p – 1]/[p2 + (1 – p)2] which is greater than 2p – 1.
Hence, Bob follows his private signal—invest if private information is good and
do not invest if private information is bad. If, instead, Angela did not buy, then
Bob faces a price 1 – 2p and, once again, a simple calculation shows that he will
follow his signal. Every subsequent investor follows his or her own private infor-
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11For instance, only a summary statistic of predecessor’s actions, such as the aggregate investment in
the last year, may be observable to future investors.
12Such as differences in the accuracy of investors’information or in the payoffs they obtain from the
investment.
13See also Lee (1995).mation precisely because the price adjusts in such a manner that, based only on
publicly available information, a person is exactly indifferent between buying and
selling. If a person’s private information tips the balance in favor of buying or
selling, this private information is revealed by the individual’s action.
Consequently, herd behavior will not arise when the price adjusts to reflect avail-
able information. Under these assumptions, the stock market is informationally
efficient. The price reflects fundamentals and there is no mispricing.
Avery and Zemsky add another dimension to the underlying uncertainty in
the basic model considered in the previous paragraph. Suppose that there are
two types of investors, H and L. Type H investors have very accurate informa-
tion (pH close to 1) and type L have very noisy information (pL close to 0.5).
Further, suppose that the proportion of the two types of investors in the popula-
tion is not common knowledge among market participants. In particular, this
proportion is not known to the market-makers. Hence, although at any point in
time the price in the stock market reflects all public information, the price does
not reveal the private information of all previous investors. Aclustering of iden-
tical decisions may arise naturally in a well informed market (one in which most
of the investors are of type H) because most of the investors have the same (very
informative) private signal realization. Further, a clustering of identical deci-
sions is also natural in a poorly informed market (one in which most of the
investors are of type L) because of herding by type L investors who mistakenly
believe that most of the other investors are of type H. Thus, informationally inef-
ficient herd behavior may occur and can lead to price bubbles and mispricing
when the accuracy (or lack thereof) of the information with market participants
is not common knowledge. Traders may mimic the behavior of an initial group
of investors in the erroneous belief that this group knows something.
Thus, when the uncertainty is only about the value of the underlying invest-
ment, the stock market price is informationally efficient and herd behavior will not
occur. However, when there is an additional dimension to the uncertainty, namely
uncertainty about the accuracy of the information possessed by market partici-
pants, a one-dimensional stock price is no longer efficient and herd behavior can
arise, even when investors are rational. 
Derivative securities add multiple dimensions to stock prices. They aid in
the market price discovery process by providing a link between the prices in the
cash market today and the prices in forward markets. Options markets provide
valuable information on the expected volatility of prices and hence about the
risk of holding the underlying spot asset. Avery and Zemsky conjecture that the
availability of derivatives may make herding and price bubbles less pronounced,
since multidimensional stock prices are better equipped to reveal multidimen-
sional uncertainty.
Reputation-Based Herding
Scharfstein and Stein (1990); Trueman (1994); Zweibel (1995); Prendergast and Stole
(1996); and Graham (1999); provide another theory of herding based on the reputa-
tional concerns of fund managers or analysts. Reputation or, more broadly, career
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The basic idea (in Scharfstein and Stein) is that if an investment manager and her
employer are uncertain of the manager’s ability to pick the right stocks, conformity
with other investment professionals preserves the fog—that is, the uncertainty
regarding the ability of the manager to manage the portfolio. This benefits the manager
and if other investment professionals are in a similar situation then herding occurs.
Consider the decisions of two investment managers, I1 and I2, faced with an
identical investment opportunity. Each manager Ii, i = 1,2, may be of high ability
or low ability, and their type or ability level is chosen independently. Ahigh ability
manager receives informative signals about the return from an investment,
whereas a low ability manager’s signal is pure noise. Neither the manager Ii nor
her employer Ei knows whether the manager Ii is of low or high ability. Each
manager and employer has an identical prior belief about the manager’s type. This
belief is updated after the decisions of the two managers and the return from the
investment (which is observed whether or not an investment is made) are
observed. The price of the investment remains fixed throughout.
If both managers are of high ability then they observe the same signal real-
ization (good or bad) from an informative signal distribution (but neither manager
observes the other’s signal realization). If both managers are of low ability then
they observe independent draws of a signal (either G or B) from a distribution that
is pure noise. If one manager is of high ability and the other of low ability, then
they observe independent draws from the informative signal distribution and the
noisy signal distribution respectively. The informative and noisy signal distribu-
tions are such that the ex ante probability of observing G is the same with either
distribution.14 Thus, after observing her signal realization a manager does not
update her prior beliefs about her own type.
I1 makes her investment decisions first and then I2 does so. I1’s decision is
based only on her signal realization (which may either be informative or pure
noise—I1 does not know which it is). I2’s decision is based on her own signal real-
ization and on I1’s decision. In the final period, the investments pay off and the
two investors are rewarded based on an ex post assessment of their abilities.
This game has a herding equilibrium in which I1 follows her own signal and
I2 imitates I1 regardless of her own (I2’s) signal. The intuition behind this result is
that since I2 is uncertain about her own ability, she dare not take a decision
contrary to I1’s decision and risk being considered dumb (in case her conflicting
decision turns out to be incorrect). Thus, it is better for I2 to imitate I1 even if her
own information tells her otherwise. If the common decision turns out to be incor-
rect it will be attributed to an unlucky draw of the same signal realization from an
informative distribution, thus increasing the posterior beliefs of her employer that
I2 is of high ability.15 I1 is happy to go along with this arrangement as she too is
unsure of her own abilities—I2’s imitation also provides I1 with cover.
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14The noisy signal is, of course, uncorrelated with and the informative signal is positively correlated
with the return on the investment.
15Observe that the signals of two informed managers are positively correlated whereas the signals of
two uninformed managers are uncorrelated.  Hence, an identical action (even incorrect ones) by the two
managers makes it more likely that they are both informed.If there are several managers deciding in sequence, everyone imitates the decision
of the first manager. Eventually there will be a preponderance of G signals (B signals)
if the investment is profitable (unprofitable). However, this private information will
not be revealed because all subsequent managers, without regard to their information,
imitate the first manager’s decision. Thus, the herding is inefficient. Moreover, it is
idiosyncratic because it is predicated on the first individual’s signal realization and
fragile since the herd behavior is based on very little information. Many of the impli-
cations of this theory are similar to that of informational herding with rigid prices.
As in the papers by Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch
(1992), here too it is assumed that the investment opportunity is available to all
individuals at the same price. The extent to which the movement of prices in a
well-functioning market mitigate the inefficiencies in Scharfstein and Stein’s
model is not clear. 
Compensation-Based Herding
If an investment manager’s (i.e., an agent’s) compensation depends on how her
performance compares with that of other similar professionals, then this distorts
the agent’s incentives and she ends up with an inefficient portfolio (see Brennan
(1993) and Roll (1992)). It may also lead to herd behavior.
Maug and Naik (1996) consider a risk-averse investor (the agent) whose
compensation increases with her own performance and decreases in the performance
of a benchmark (which may be the performance of a separate group of investors or
the return of an appropriate index). Both the agent and her benchmark have imper-
fect, private information about stock returns. The benchmark investor makes her
investment decisions first and the agent chooses her portfolio after observing the
benchmark’s actions. Then, as argued in the section on information-based herding
above, the agent has an incentive to imitate the benchmark in that her optimal invest-
ment portfolio moves closer to the benchmark’s portfolio after the agent observes the
benchmark’s actions. Furthermore, the compensation scheme provides an additional
reason to imitate the benchmark. The fact that her compensation decreases if she
underperforms the benchmark causes the agent to skew her investments even more
towards the benchmark’s portfolio than if she were trading on her own account only.
It is optimal for the principal (the employer of the agent) to write such a rela-
tive performance contract when there is moral hazard16 or adverse selection.17Any
other efficient contract (i.e., any contract that maximizes a weighted sum of the
principal’s and the agent’s utility) will also link the agent’s compensation to the
benchmark’s performance. Thus herding may be constrained efficient (the
constraints being imposed by moral hazard or adverse selection). However, the
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16For example, the agent may not be hard-working and the principal is unable to observe how much
effort the agent puts in to researching her investment options.  A relative performance contract in which
the bonus paid to the agent depends on how well she does relative to the benchmark would provide the
right incentives to the agent.
17For example, a potential agent may be an incompetent portfolio manager, no matter how hard she
works, but the principal cannot gauge her skill level. A relative performance contract would dissuade an
incompetent agent from taking up a job as a portfolio manager.compensation scheme selected by an employer would seek to maximize the
employer’s profits rather than society’s welfare. 
The “constrained efficiency” of benchmark-based compensation in Maug and
Naik (1996) is due to their assumption of a single risky asset. Admati and
Pfleiderer (1997) analyze a multiple (risky)-assets model of delegated portfolio
management in which the agent investor has private information about stock
returns. They find that commonly observed benchmark-based compensation
contracts for the agent are inefficient, inconsistent with optimal risk sharing, and
ineffective in overcoming moral hazard and adverse selection problems. Unlike in
a single risky-asset model, a benchmark-adjusted return is not a sufficient statistic
for the agent’s private information in a multiple-risky-assets model. Hence the
sharp difference in results from these two types of models.
II. The Empirical Evidence
The empirical studies, by and large, do not examine or test a particular model of herd
behavior—exceptions are Wermers (1999) and Graham (1999). Rather, the approach
generally used is a purely statistical one, to gauge whether clustering of decisions,
irrespective of the underlying reasons for such behavior, is taking place in certain
securities markets. Thus, there is lack of a direct link between the theoretical discus-
sion of herd behavior and the empirical specifications used to test for herding. Also,
many studies do not differentiate between “true” and “spurious” herding, and it is
not clear to what extent the statistical analysis is merely picking up common
responses of participants to publicly available information. While some researchers
attempt to correct for fundamentals, it is hard to do so for two reasons: first, it is
difficult to pinpoint what constitutes “fundamentals,” and second, in many cases it
is difficult to measure and to quantify them. 
Herding in the Stock Market
Several papers use a statistical measure of herding put forward by Lakonishok,
Shleifer, and Vishny (hereafter referred to as LSV) (1992). They define and
measure herding as the average tendency of a group of money managers to buy
(sell) particular stocks at the same time, relative to what could be expected if
money managers traded independently. While it is called a herding measure, it
really assesses the correlation in trading patterns for a particular group of traders
and their tendency to buy and sell the same set of stocks. Herding clearly leads to
correlated trading, but the reverse need not be true.
The LSV measure is based on trades conducted by a subset of market partic-
ipants over a period of time. This subset usually consists of a homogenous group
of fund managers whose behavior is of interest. Let B(i,t) [S(i,t)] be the number
of investors in this subset who buy [sell] stock i in quarter t and H(i,t) be the
measure of herding in stock i for quarter t. The measure of herding used by LSV
is defined as follows:
H(i,t) = |p(i,t) – p(t)| – AF(i,t)
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i that were traded by at least one of the fund managers in the group. The adjust-
ment factor is
AF(i,t) = E[|p(i,t) – p(t)|],
where the expectation is calculated under the null hypothesis. B(i,t) follows a
binomial distribution with parameter p(t).
Under the null hypothesis of no herding the probability of a randomly chosen
money manager being a net buyer of stock i is p(t) and, therefore, the expected value
of |p(i,t) – p(t)| is AF(i,t). If N(i,t) = B(i,t) + S(i,t) is large then under the null hypoth-
esis AF(i,t) will be close to zero since p(i,t) tends to p(t) as the number of active
traders increases. The adjustment factor is included in the herding measure to take
care of the bias in |p(i,t) – p(t)| for stock-quarters which are not traded by a large
number of participants . For small N(i,t), AF(i,t) will generally be positive. Values of
H(i,t) significantly different from zero are interpreted as evidence of herd behavior. 
LSV (1992) use the investment behavior of 769 U.S. tax-exempt equity funds
managed by 341 different money mangers to empirically test for herd behavior.
Most of the fund sponsors are corporate pension plans, with the rest consisting of
endowments and state/municipal pension plans. Since some managers ran multiple
funds the unit of analysis is the money manager. Their panel data set covering the
period 1985–89 consists of the number of shares of each stock held by each fund
at the end of each quarter. The funds considered managed a total of $124 billion,
which was 18 percent of the total actively managed holdings of pension plans.
LSV conclude that money managers in their sample do not exhibit significant
herding. There is some evidence of such behavior being relatively more prevalent
in stocks of small companies compared to those of large company stocks (where
most institutional trades are concentrated). LSV’s explanation is that there is less
public information on small stocks and hence money managers pay relatively
greater attention to the actions of other players in making their own investment
decisions regarding small stocks. LSV’s examinations of herding conditional on
past stock performance, of herding within certain industry groups and between
industries, and of herding among subsets of money managers differentiated by size
of assets under management, reveal no evidence of herd behavior. However, as
LSV caution, the impact of herding is difficult to evaluate without precise knowl-
edge of the demand elasticities for stocks. It is possible that even mild herding
behavior could have large price effects.
Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (hereafter referred to as GTW) (1995) use data
on portfolio changes of 274 mutual funds between end-1974 and end-1984 to
examine herd behavior among fund managers and the relation of such behavior to
momentum investment strategies and performance. Using the LSV measure of
herding, H(i,t), GTW find little evidence of (economically significant) herding in
their sample. The average value of H(i,t) for their sample is 2.5 and is similar to that
found by LSV for pension funds, 2.7. That is, if 100 funds were trading the average
stock-quarter pair, then 2.5 more funds traded on the same side of the market than
would be expected if portfolio managers made their decisions independently of one
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their sample exhibit greater herding in buying past winners than in selling past
losers. Herding on the sell side, though positive, is less pronounced and only
weakly related to past performance.18 This is consistent with some of their other
findings, namely, that the average mutual fund is a momentum investor in that it
buys past winners but does not systematically divest past losers. And such behavior
leads to some herding in stocks that have performed well but there is no evidence
of herding out of stocks that have earned poor returns in the immediate past.19
LSV and GTW test for herding at the stock level and find little evidence of it.
What they rule out is unintentional herding, and not intentional herding, as we do
not expect to find herding at the level of individual stocks. Nevertheless, their
results are surprising because we would expect investors to react to public infor-
mation such as forecasts of analysts and earnings announcements by firms. 
There are two reasons why the extent of herding may be understated. First, the
types of mutual funds considered is too heterogeneous; and second, for many stock-
quarter pairs the trading volumes may be too low for observing any significant
herding. GTW (1995) attempt to address such biases. Differentiating funds according
to their stated investment strategies—aggressive growth funds, balanced funds, growth
funds, growth-income funds, income funds—they find even less evidence of herding
than in the total sample. However, when they restrict attention to quarters where at
least a certain number of trades take place they find greater evidence of herding
behavior.
To evaluate fund performance in the context of herding, GTW develop a
measure of “herding by an individual fund” to assess to what extent a particular fund
runs with the crowd or against it. They find that fund performance is significantly
correlated with the tendency of a fund to herd. However, this correlation is explained
by the fact that a tendency to herd is highly correlated with the tendency to pursue
momentum strategies and to buy past winners. The relationship between a fund’s
tendency to run with the pack and its performance dissipates once GTW control for
the tendency of funds to get into stocks that have performed well in the recent past.
Wermers (1999) uses the LSV measure and data on quarterly equity holdings
of virtually all mutual funds that were in existence between 1975 and 1994 and
finds that for the average stock there is some evidence of herding by mutual
funds.20 For Wermers’sample the average level of herding (i.e., of H(i,t)) computed
over all stocks and quarters for the two decades covered is 3.4. While statistically
significant, this value for H(i,t) is only slightly larger than that reported by LSV
(1992) suggesting that there is somewhat greater herding among mutual funds than
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18Note that short-selling constraints on most mutual funds might prevent them from herding on the
sell-side. On this point see Wylie (1997).
19They also show that the previous quarter’s returns had a greater effect on portfolio choice of
managers than returns posted in the more distant past. Further, for all “objective mutual fund categories”
and the total sample of funds, momentum-investing behavior generally constituted a move into well-
performing large capitalization stocks.
20The data set in Wermers (1999) is a superset of that used in GTW (1995) and includes information
for the period 1985-1994. To study herd behavior, Wermers restricts attention to stock trading where at
least 5 different funds were active in a particular quarter.among pension funds. An analysis of trading behavior, when a larger number of
funds are active in a stock, shows that herding by mutual funds does not increase
with trading activity and actually falls off as the number of active funds increases.
This is due to the fact that stocks traded by a large number of funds tend to be large
capitalization stocks and herding in these is generally lower.
An examination of herding levels among funds with different investment
objectives—aggressive growth, growth, growth-income, balanced/income, interna-
tional/other—shows that growth-oriented funds have a greater tendency to herd
than income-oriented funds. This could be because growth-oriented funds trade and
hold a larger proportion of growth stocks, many of which are small caps on whom
public information is harder to obtain and analyze and, as a consequence, there is
greater scope for herding behavior. It is noteworthy that the average herding
measure for all funds is not significantly lower, and in many cases is higher, than
that calculated for subgroups with different investment styles. This suggests that
herds form across subgroups as much as within subgroups of funds or that it merely
reflects the fact that many funds use a common investment strategy.21
Differentiating by market capitalization, Wermers finds that there is, in fact,
greater herding in small, growth stocks. Also, contrary to GTW’s finding reported
earlier that herding is more noticeable on the buy-side of the market, Wermer shows
that, for all funds taken together, herds form much more often on the sell-side of the
market than on the buy-side and this is especially pronounced for smaller stocks. The
clearest picture of herding emerges in the sale of small stocks by growth-oriented
funds and international funds. This is consistent with herding theories based on
agency problems and those on information differentials among market participants.
Following up on GTW (1995), who show that positive-feedback strategies are
widely used by mutual fund managers, Wermers (1999) finds that herding levels
are somewhat higher among stocks that have large positive or negative returns in
prior quarters. Herding on the buy-side is strongest in stocks having high prior-
quarter returns and sell-side herding is most evident for stocks with low prior-
quarter returns. He also finds that positive-feedback investment strategies are
more likely to involve the buying of past winners than the sale of past losers.
Window-dressing explanations, while consistent with selling losers, does not seem
to be an important determinant of herding behavior since there is not much varia-
tion in the sell-side herding levels across quarters.
To assess whether a sudden increase in buying and selling of stocks by mutual
funds could be driven by new cash inflows and widespread redemptions, Wermers
correlates average buying and selling herding measures with various measures of
present and lagged cash inflows. He concludes that such flows do not have much
effect on the tendency of mutual funds to herd into stocks. He also shows that minor
portfolio adjustments in the same direction by many funds does not underlie the
observed results and that restricting the analysis to trades that exceed 0.1 percent of
total net assets for the trading fund reveals even higher levels of herding. 
Sushil Bikhchandani and Sunil Sharma
296
21It is also possible that the analysis is picking up trading by funds belonging to the same fund family
but with different investment objectives. However, Wermers shows that when the fund family rather than
the individual fund is used as the unit of measurement, herding levels though lower are not significantly
diminished.What is the impact of herding by investors into or out of particular stocks?
Wermers’ results suggest that stocks bought by herds, on average, have higher
contemporaneous returns as well as higher returns in the following six months
than stocks sold by herds. This difference is most pronounced in contemporaneous
returns for small stocks but a modest differential is also observed for large
stocks.22 Wermers argues that since this return differential is not temporary but
persists over some time period the observed herding may be “rational” and a stabi-
lizing force that speeds the incorporation of new information into prices.23
Drawbacks with the LSV Measure of Herding
The LSV (1992) measure of herding is deficient in two respects. First, the measure
only uses the number of investors on the two sides of the market, without regard
to the amount of stock they buy or sell, to assess the extent of herding in a partic-
ular stock. Consider a situation in which the buyers and sellers are similar in
number but the buyers collectively demand a substantial amount of the stock while
the sellers only put a relatively small amount in the market. In such situations,
even though herding into the stock exists, the LSV measure would not pick it up. 
Second, it is not possible to identify intertemporal trading patterns using the LSV
measure. For example, the LSV measure could be used to test whether herding in a
particular stock persists over time, that is evaluate whether E[H(i, t)| H(i,t – k)] =
E[H(i, t)], but it cannot inform us whether it is the same funds that continue to herd.
In addition, in applying the LSVmeasure, the choice of investment category iand
the time interval t over which trading data are observed is very important. For
example, IMF managers might not observe, either instantaneously or with short lags,
holdings of other managers at the level of individual stocks. The evidence provided
by Shiller and Pound (1989) is mixed. If, indeed, holdings of other investment enti-
ties can only be observed with a (considerable) lag, then intentional herding cannot
arise because what cannot be observed cannot be imitated. Managers may be able to
observe actions at a more aggregate level––stocks in specific industries, sectors, or
countries. Therefore, there may be a better chance of detecting herding at this level. 
Furthermore, the frequency with which fund managers trade in a stock is
crucial for selecting the time interval t. If the average time between trades of a
stock is a quarter or more, then one may use quarterly (or shorter time period) data
to look for herd behavior. If, on the other hand, the average time between trades
of a stock is a month or less, then a quarter is too long a time period for discerning
herd behavior. The market for large company stock is much more liquid than that
for small company stock. Hence, the appropriate window of observation, t, is
likely to be relatively smaller for large company stock.
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22Given the quarterly data window, it is not possible to determine whether within quarter feedback
strategies or herding itself is responsible for the contemporaneous return differential. 
23Nofsinger and Sias (1999) in their examination of herding by institutional investors find no
evidence of return reversal over a two-year period, and show that stocks purchased by institutional
investors outperform those they sell. They suggest that this could be due to the use of momentum invest-
ment strategies, or because institutional investors are better informed and better able to predict short-term
performance than other investors.  A Modification of the LSV Measure of Herding
Wermers (1995) develops a new measure of herding that captures both the direc-
tion and intensity of trading by investors. This new measure, which he calls a port-
folio-change measure (PCM) of correlated trading, overcomes the first drawback
listed above. Intuitively, herding is measured by the extent to which portfolio-
weights assigned to the various stocks by different money managers move in the
same direction. The intensity of beliefs is captured by the percent change of the
fraction accounted for by a stock in a fund portfolio. The cross-correlation PCM




n,t = the change in portfolio I’s weight of n during the period (quarter) [t – 1,t],
∆ω ~J
n,t = the change in portfolio J’s weight of n during the period [t – τ – 1,t – τ ],
Nt = number of stocks in the intersection of the set of tradable securities in port-
folio I during period [t – 1,t] and the set of tradable securities in portfolio J during
period [t – τ – 1,t – τ ], and 
is the time-series average of the product of the cross-sectional standard-deviations.
Wermers (1995) finds a significant level of herding by mutual funds using the
PCM measure. The data set is the same as that in Wermers (1999). To measure
herding in the aggregate, Wermers (1995) randomly splits his sample of mutual funds
into two groups and then uses the PCM measure of correlated trading to compare the
revisions of the net asset value weighted portfolios of the two groups. For each
quarter, the PCM measure is calculated across all stocks; an average across all quar-
ters is the measure of herding for a given random split. A set of 10 randomizations,
of the 274 mutual funds in the sample, into two groups of 137 funds is conducted and
the mean PCM for this set turns out to be 0.1855 and statistically significant. 
In contrast to H(i,t), the herding measure of LSV (1992), the PCM measure of
herding increases as the number of funds trading a particular stock increases, showing
that when the number of funds active in a particular stock rises, it also results in a
greater proportion of them trading on the same side of the market. Wermers shows
that for his sample the PCM measure of herding when “at least five funds are active
in a particular stock” is about half that obtained when the calculation is restricted to
quarters in which “at least 25 funds are active in a particular stock.”24
ˆ () ˜˜ ,
,,
/























































Sushil Bikhchandani and Sunil Sharma
298
24The high correlation between the number of funds trading a particular stock and the stock’s market
capitalization leads him to suggests that there is greater herding in large-cap stocks.  This could be a result
of sample selection since the mutual funds considered mainly trade in large-cap stocks and hence the
sample may not be very informative about the small-cap market.The PCM measure also has some drawbacks. While one should weight the
buy or sell decision by the amount traded, doing this introduces another bias since
larger fund managers tend to get a higher weight. Also, Wermer’s statistic which
looks at changes in fractional weights of stocks in portfolios may yield spurious
herding as weights of stocks that increase (decrease) in price tend to go up, even
without any buying (selling). Taking the average of beginning and end-quarter
prices to determine portfolio weights may correct for it as Wermers claims but that
depends on exactly how it is done. Further, the justification for using net asset
values as weights in constructing the PCM measure is not clear.
Other Measures of Herding 
Another strand of the literature looks at whether the returns on individual stocks
cluster more tightly around the market return during large price changes. The
rationale is that if during periods of market stress individual stocks have a
tendency to become more tightly clustered around the market, then this is
evidence that during such periods markets are less discriminating of individual
stocks and treat all stocks similarly. Trading intervals characterized by large
swings in average prices are examined because the expectation is that herds are
more likely to form in periods of market stress when individuals are more likely
to suppress their own beliefs in favor of the market consensus.
Christie and Huang (1995), using daily returns on U.S. equities, show that
under their measure of cross-sectional dispersion, there is relatively higher disper-
sion around the market return at times of large price movements. This is inter-
preted as evidence against herding. They also check whether the failure to detect
herding may be due to returns clustering around the returns of firms that share
common characteristics rather than around the average return of all market partic-
ipants. Using industry-specific averages, they still obtain the same results. 
However, as Richards (1999) points out, the Christie and Huang test (and a
related test by Chang and others, 1998) looks for evidence of a particular form of
herding and that too only in the asset-specific component of returns. It does not
allow for other forms of herding that may show up in the common component of
returns, for example, when prices of all assets in a class (or market or country)
change in the same direction. The Christie and Huang test should, therefore, be
regarded as a gauge of a particular form of herding and the absence of evidence
against this form of herding should, therefore, not be construed as showing that
other types of herding do not exist.
In a recent paper, Nofsinger and Sias (1999) adopt a different approach to
examine the relative importance of herding by institutional and individual investors.
They use monthly data on stock returns from the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP), and annual data on the fraction of outstanding shares held by institu-
tional investors for all firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange from Standard
and Poors’ Security Owners’Stock Guides. Their methodology can be described as
follows: For each year (1977–85) they first partition firms into deciles based on the
fraction of shares held by institutional investors. Then, for each initial institutional
ownership decile, they further partition the firms into deciles based on the change in
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Finally, they reaggregate the firms based on their change in ownership decile rank
and create 10 portfolios of stocks that have similar institutional ownership at the
beginning of each year (with October being the origin) but large differences in the
change in institutional ownership over the year. They show that there is a strong posi-
tive relation between annual changes in institutional ownership and returns over the
herding interval (in their case a year). Furthermore this result holds across capital-
ization, that is, for small and large stocks. The authors interpret this as evidence of
intrayear positive feedback trading by institutional investors and that institutional
herding has a larger effect on stock returns than herding by individuals.
There are two major drawbacks to the Nofsinger and Sias analysis. First, the
window of observation, one full year, is too large. Admittedly, this is a restriction
imposed by their data. In any case, a monthly or quarterly window would have
been more suitable for judging the extent of herding. Second, as the authors recog-
nize, the use of changes in the fraction of shares held by institutions to measure
herding is problematic. A substantial increase in this fraction need not reflect
herding, but merely a large position by one or two institutions. Institutional owner-
ship could grow for other reasons as well—some institutional investors face
minimum capitalization restrictions, and thus a firm may become more widely
held by institutions as it becomes larger.
Herding in Other Financial Markets
Unlike the above papers (which use quarterly data on equity portfolios), Kodres and
Pritsker (1996) analyze daily trading data on futures contracts to detect herd behavior.
The data cover the period August 1992 to August 1994 and were obtained from the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), which has an end-of-day
reporting requirement for “large” traders defined as those who own futures contracts
above certain threshold levels. Such information is monitored by the CFTC to ensure
that players do not attempt to manipulate the markets. These positions are not
publicly known, although traders can see each other trade on the exchange floor.25
The futures contracts in the data set are for interest rates (3-month Euro dollar,
91-day Treasury bill, 5-year note, 10-year note, 30-year treasury bond), the S&P
500 index, and foreign exchange (British pound, Canadian dollar, German deutsche
mark, Japanese yen, Swiss franc). The data are truncated in the sense that traders’
whose positions are smaller than the critical threshold that triggers the reporting
requirement do not appear in the data set. In fact, a participant may be continuously
present in the market but only intermittently so in the data set. Also, the average
open interest held by the large traders during the sample period varies from 40
percent for Swiss francs to 72 percent for 5-year treasury notes. Except in the 3-
month Eurodollar and 5- and 10-year treasury notes, in all other securities the open
interest held by smaller traders exceeds 40 percent. To the extent that information
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25Note that since positions reported to the CFTC are not made available to other market participants
the possibility of (intentional) herding is decreased. If trading becomes computerized, observability may
be decreased or increased depending on how the computer program is set-up. gathering is more costly for small traders, informational cascades are more likely
to form among them. An analysis that uses data on “large” trader reporting
requirements neglects the behavior of “small” traders (who collectively may make
up a substantial fraction of the market) and thus underestimates herding behavior.
Large participants are classified into the following categories: broker-dealer,
commercial bank, foreign bank, hedge fund, insurance company, mutual fund,
pension fund, and savings and loan association. This enables testing for herd behavior
among institutions belonging to the same category. However, note that an exchange-
clearing member may have several traders, one trading for a pension fund, another
for a mutual fund, and so on. If so, then such traders, to the extent that they talk to
each other, share the exchange-clearing member’s research and other information, are
more likely to herd. Therefore, while one may expect that institutions in the same
categories with similar objectives would be natural groups within which to examine
herding, it is possible that much of the observed herd behavior takes place across
institutional categories by traders affiliated with the same clearing member. Because
traders are not identified by institution in the data, it is not possible to examine such
behavior or correct for it in assessing herding across different firms.
Kodres and Pritsker (1996) focus on looking at directional changes in positions
(irrespective of magnitudes) and first conduct a simple correlation analysis of
changes in positions for each pair of participants in the same institutional category.
This is done for 29 combinations of institutional types and contracts, for which
there were at least 40 large traders during the sample period. An absence of herding
among large traders would imply that correlation coefficients be statistically indis-
tinguishable from zero. In only 5 out of the 29 type-contract pairs are the correla-
tion coefficients different from zero at a 5 percent significance level. This analysis
suggests that broker-dealers and hedge funds with positions in foreign currency
contracts were most likely to change their positions at the same time.
Next, a probit model is used to investigate whether some large participants are
more likely to buy or sell when other participants are doing the same. Each cate-
gory of institution is randomly divided into two subgroups with the first subgroup
being half as big as the second one. The second subgroup is the herd. For each
member of the first subgroup, a probit regression is run to determine to what
extent the probability of a buy trade depends on the proportion of buys relative to
total trades in the second subgroup. The estimated parameters are used to test
whether the first subgroup follows the second.26 Herding is detected in 13 of the
29 participant type-contract pairs analyzed. The results suggest that herding is
most likely by broker-dealers and foreign banks with positions in foreign currency
(German deutsche mark, Japanese yen) and broker-dealer, pension funds and
hedge funds with positions in the S&P 500 Index futures contracts. It is less likely
in futures on U.S. government paper.27 However, the probit analog of R2 for the
regressions is low––generally below 0.10––suggesting that imitation of the second
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26To ensure some precision in the estimated parameters, Kodres an Pritsker (1996) perform the regres-
sions for only those participants that altered their positions on at least 30 days while remaining in the sample. 
27An examination by contract type but without regard to institutional categories showed herding in
all contracts except those for the 5-year treasury note, 30-year treasury note and the Eurodollar.subgroup by members of the first subgroup accounted for a small part of the vari-
ation in their positions. 
These results need to be interpreted with caution. Although Kodres and
Pritsker (1996) attempt to examine herding intensity by including the net number
of contracts bought or sold in their probit analysis, they do not distinguish between
intentional and unintentional herding. Also, as the authors themselves note,
observed changes in futures trading could be offset by changes in underlying cash
positions and, therefore, herding observed when the analysis is restricted to certain
futures contracts may not show up if a portfolio-wide perspective is taken.
Furthermore, data censoring forces the authors to restrict their analysis to “large”
participants whose positions are greater than certain thresholds––smaller partici-
pants are not included in the analysis. And even for large participants the analysis
examines those participants who make frequent position changes. It is possible
that in markets where small participants account for a sizable fraction of the open
interest, herding takes place and is an important feature of the market. Of course,
whether such herding by smaller participants can have dramatic implications for
prices and trading volumes can only be answered in the context of a specific
market and a particular environment.
Herding Among Investment Analysts and Newsletters
One branch of the literature on herding, rather than examining the clustering of
decisions to trade in particular financial instruments, looks at herd behavior
among investment analysts and newsletters.28 In a setting where actions (i.e.,
recommendations) of other newsletters are easily observable, there is potentially
fertile ground for herd behavior. While this setting is another way to shed empir-
ical light on the usefulness of different models of herd behavior, it leaves open the
question of to what extent herding by analysts in recommending certain invest-
ments is actually followed by investors herding into those investments. Recently,
there has been some skepticism about the “independence” of research findings of
investment banks and other researchers about the prospects of firms who are their
clients or would–be clients.29 It is difficult to ascertain to what extent traders and
other decision makers are swayed by newsletter recommendations. Nevertheless,
the literature on herding by analysts provides some insights into the various
motives that could lead to herd behavior.
Following Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Graham (1999) builds a reputational
model of herd behavior among investment newsletters. In Graham’s model the
likelihood of herding 
(i) decreases with the analysts ability—a low ability analyst has greater incentive to
hide in the herd than a high ability analyst;
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28Using the LSV measure to examine stock recommendations by newsletters followed by the Hulbert
Financial Digest over the period 1980–96, Jaffee and Mahoney (1998) find weak evidence of herding
among newsletters in their sample. The value for the herding measure in their study is of the same order
of magnitude as that found for money managers by LSV (1992).
29See, for example, Michaely and Womack (1999).(ii) increases with the analysts initial reputation—analysts with high reputations (and
presumably salaries) are more conservative in bucking the consensus and herd to
protect their current status and pay levels; those with lesser reputations have “less
to lose” and hence more likely to act on their private information;
(iii) increases with the strength of prior public information—when aggregate public
information is strongly held (i.e. the prior distribution has a relatively smaller
variance) and reinforced by the actions of the market leader, an individual analyst
is less likely to take an opposing view based on private information; and
(iv) increases with the level of correlation across informative signals.
The data used by Graham (1999) covers the period 1980–92 period and
contains 5,293 recommendations made by 237 newsletters. Given its stature and
accessibility, the Value Line Investment Survey is used as the market leader and the
benchmark against which analysts compare their advice. An announcement is a
recommendation by a newsletter to increase or decrease portfolio equity
weights—the question being to examine whether a newsletter changes its equity
weight recommendation in the same direction as that recommended by Value Line.
The dependent variable in the empirical analysis is defined to take a value of one
when a newsletter makes the same directional recommendation for equity weights
as Value Line, and to take a value of zero otherwise. 
The main result in Graham (1999) is that the precision of private information
(i.e., ability of the analyst) is the key factor in determining whether a newsletter
herds on Value Line. He also shows that herding is more likely if the reputation of
the newsletter is high, prior information is strongly held and informative signals
are highly correlated. These results seem to hold even after allowing for the possi-
bility that newsletters may be recommending momentum-investment strategies. 
Chevalier and Ellison (1999) (for mutual fund managers) and Hong, Kubik,
and Solomon (2000) (for sell-side security analysts) also examine whether repu-
tational and career concerns induce herding. The former article uses Morningstar
data for fund managers of growth and growth and income funds over the period
1992–95; and the latter uses data from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System
(I/B/E/S) database over the period 1983–96 on estimates by 8,421 analysts
covering 4,527 firms. Their results show that poorly performing employees are
generally less likely to be promoted and more likely to be fired. However, condi-
tional upon performance, inexperienced employees are more likely to suffer career
setbacks than their older colleagues when they make relatively bold predictions.
There is some evidence that “going out on a limb” and being wrong when you are
young and inexperienced is costly in career terms, while bucking the consensus
and being right does not significantly add to career prospects. They find that such
incentives make inexperienced asset managers/analysts take less risks and herd
more than their experienced counterparts. This is in contrast to the Graham (1999)
result that analysts with high reputations are more likely to herd. 
Welch (2000) uses Zacks Historical Recommendation Database to examine
herding among security analysts, which he defines as the influence exerted on an
analyst by the prevailing consensus and recent revisions by other analysts. The
data set used consists of about 50,000 recommendations issued by 226 brokers
over the period 1989–94. A recommendation consists of categorizing a particular
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data includes only those stocks that had at least 16 recommendations over the time
period considered. Welch’s null hypothesis is that for each recommendation, the
transition from one category to another is generated by “no herding.” He then uses
a parsimonious parametric specification of how this transition is affected by the
prevailing consensus and recent revisions by analysts, to examine whether herding
does or does not occur. 
His results suggest that the prevailing consensus, as well as the two most recent
revisions by other analysts influence recommendations by analysts. The revisions by
others have a stronger influence if they are more recent, and if they turn out to be
good predictors of security returns ex post. The effect of the prevailing consensus,
however, does not depend on whether it is a good predictor of subsequent stock
movements. Welch interprets this as evidence that the influence of recent revisions
by other analysts stems from a desire to exploit short-lived information about funda-
mentals, while herding toward the consensus is less likely to be caused by informa-
tion about fundamentals. He also finds that herding toward the consensus is much
stronger in market upturns and, thus, booming markets aggregate less information
and, therefore, could be more “fragile” than market downturns.
The above studies may be seen as providing conservative estimates of herding
by analysts. The reason is that they use the available universe of stocks to examine
herd behavior without, for example, distinguishing between large- and small-cap
stocks. Investors typically have much more information on the heavily followed
large cap-stocks, which typically also have longer track records. Fewer analysts
follow smaller stocks, information on them is much harder to obtain, and the market
consensus, if it exists, is likely to be less firmly grounded in reality. It is possible that
herding among analysts is much stronger in small stocks than in larger cap stocks.
Similarly, it may be that herding by newsletters is much more likely in emerging
market financial instruments than in those available in developed markets. 
Herding in Emerging Stock Markets
In the aftermath of the recent crises in emerging markets, considerable attention
has focused on the question of whether herding by international investors’leads to
excessive volatility in the flow of capital to developing countries. Much of the
research has focused on Korea and we suspect this is due to the availability of
microlevel data that is needed to shed light on questions relating to the trading
strategy of investors.30
Kim and Wei (1999a), using data for December 1996 to June 1998, investigate
the trading strategies of investors in the Korean stock market. The data set,
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30Note that in Korea, like many emerging markets, other cross-border capital flows (bank loans,
bonds, trade credits, foreign direct investment) significantly dwarf cross-border equity flows. To make a
judgement on the volatility of capital flows, it is important to examine the non-equity transactions of
foreign investors. See, for example, Kinoshita and Mody (1999), for an empirical examination of the rela-
tive importance of privately-held information obtained through direct production experience in an
emerging market country and information inferred from observing competitors, in the making of foreign
investment location decisions by Japanese firms. provided by an affiliate of the Korean Stock Exchange (KSE), reports the end-of-
month investor holdings for each stock listed on the KSE. It contains information
on whether the investor is Korean or foreign, resident or nonresident, an individual
or an institution, and whether for a particular month, the (individual and collec-
tive) investment ceilings on foreign ownership of a particular stock are binding.
Employing the LSV (1992) measure of herding, the authors conclude: 
(i) nonresident institutional investors used positive feedback trading strategies before
the crisis; after the crisis broke out in November 1997, there was even greater use
of momentum strategies by such investors;
(ii) resident institutional investors were contrarian traders before the crisis but
became positive-feedback traders during the crisis;
(iii) non-resident investors did herd significantly more than resident ones; herding
measures for individual investors were significantly higher than for institutional
investors; herding may have increased during the crisis period but this increase
was not statistically significant; and
(iv) herds of nonresident institutional investors formed more easily for the 19 Korean
stocks that are regularly reported in the Wall Street Journal and for stocks that
show extreme returns in the previous month. And, the greater pessimism of the
Western press, relative to its Korean counterpart, was reflected in greater net
selling of Korean stocks by nonresident compared to resident investors.
In another paper, Kim and Wei (1999b) use the above mentioned data set to
examine whether there are systematic differences between the trading strategies
adopted by funds registered in offshore financial centers and those domiciled in
the United States and the United Kingdom. Their results suggest that although
offshore funds trade more frequently, they do not, as a group, engage in positive-
feedback trading. However, the funds domiciled in the United States and the
United Kingdom do use momentum strategies and have higher LSVherding statis-
tics compared with the other funds. The authors conclude that, based on available
data for the Korean crisis, funds based in offshore financial centers cannot be
singled out for being particularly prone to herding.
Choe, Kho, and Stulz (1999 (hereafter referred to as CKS)), using daily transac-
tions data from the KSE, broadly come to the same conclusions. The main difference
seems to be that whereas Kim and Wei (1999a) find increased herding after the
outbreak of the crisis, CKS find that the extent of herding may have been lower. In
part, the difference could be due to different data frequencies and sample periods.
Classifying investors into three categories—domestic individual investors, domestic
institutional investors and foreign investors—CKS examine the behavior of foreign
investors in the Korean stock market before the Korean crisis (November 30,
1996–September 30, 1997) and during the height of the crisis (October 1,
1997–December 31, 1997).31
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31Their data set does not allow them to differentiate between individual and institutional foreign
investors. Also, as the authors acknowledge, since buy and sell trades are not associated with an investor
ID (only with nationality and type of investor) in their data, the computation of herding measures for
foreign investors assuming “each buy and sell trade is assumed to be done by a different foreign investor”
may lead to an upward bias in their results. Another limitation is that it is difficult, if not impossible, to
ascertain whether Korean investors are using foreign entities to trade on the KSE. Using the LSV measure of herding, CKS (1999) reveal there was significant
herding into Korean stocks. Also, prior to the crisis, foreign investors used posi-
tive-feedback trading strategies, buying (selling) stocks on days when the Korean
stock market index had risen (fallen) on the previous day. The daily herding
measures for foreign investors—values in the range 21–25 precrisis and 16–26
during the crisis, depending on stock size and on past-weeks return—are signifi-
cantly higher compared with those obtained by Wermers (1999) in his quarterly
analysis of U.S. institutional investors. They are also higher than the range of 6–16
obtained for nonresident investors by Kim and Wei (1999). During the crisis
period itself, they find some decline in herding and that foreign investors were less
likely to use momentum strategies. 
CKS also contend that foreign investors were not a destabilizing influence in
the Korean market over their sample period. Their evidence suggests that there
were no abnormal returns in short (intraday) time intervals around large foreign
trades and that, even for horizons of a few days, there was little price momentum
around days when there were large trades by foreign investors.
The study by Borensztein and Gelos (2000) does not focus on a particular
country, but instead uses a data set collected by Emerging Markets Funds
Research, Inc., on the monthly geographic asset allocations of 467 funds active in
developing countries over the period 1996:1–1999:3. These funds, classified as
global, emerging market, regional, and single-country funds, are domiciled mostly
in developed countries and offshore banking centers. For many of the markets, the
size of these funds is not insignificant and represents between 4 percent and 7
percent of the market capitalization.32
Borensztein and Gelos obtain an average LSV herding measure of 7.2 for all
funds—in the lower part of the range reported by Kim and Wei (1999) for nonres-
ident institutional investors in Korea. There is little variation in this average across
regions and over crisis and noncrisis periods. Also, in line with Kim and Wei they
find that offshore funds tend to herd less than other funds. An interesting finding
is that herding is more prevalent in larger markets, which is consistent with the
hypothesis that the funds in the sample prefer to adjust their portfolios more often
in relatively liquid markets. The authors also present some evidence that suggests
that increased herding measures are associated with higher stock return volatility,
but caution against pushing this conclusion too far.
III. Concluding Remarks
Most of the studies examining the empirical evidence on herding and its effects
have been done in the context of developed countries. In these countries, the
evidence suggests that investment managers do not exhibit significant herd
behavior and that the tendency to herd is highly correlated with a manager’s
tendency to pursue momentum investment strategies. Whether such positive-
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32Since the data set contains information on monthly asset holdings of the funds, flows to individual
countries have to be calculated by making some assumptions on changes in stock valuations. This is a
limitation of the data and is discussed by the authors. feedback or momentum strategies are efficient depends on how fast new informa-
tion is incorporated into market prices.
More empirical work needs to be done on emerging markets where, as the
evidence suggests, one is likely to find a greater tendency to herd. In these markets,
where the environment is relatively opaque because of weak reporting require-
ments, lower accounting standards, lax enforcement of regulations, and costly
information acquisition, information cascades and reputational herding are more
likely to arise. Also, because information is likely to be revealed and absorbed more
slowly, momentum investment strategies could be potentially more profitable. 
The statistical measures used in empirical studies need to be further refined to
distinguish true herd behavior from the reactions of participants to public announce-
ments or commonly available information. It should be emphasized that “adjusting
for changes in fundamentals” is easier said than done and that it is difficult to
adequately capture both the direction and intensity of herding in a particular security
or market. Furthermore, a large repricing of a security may take place with only little
trading and hence there may be very few observed changes in portfolio holdings. 
Even equipped with more sophisticated measures, examination of herd
behavior is likely to remain difficult since the requisite data will not be available.
Anonymity is important for the existence, functioning and liquidity of markets and
it may not be appropriate to require the players to reveal proprietary information
on their investment strategies.
There is always an information asymmetry between any borrower and lender,
and some element of an agency problem when owners of funds delegate investment
decisions to professional managers. Therefore, there will always be some possibility
of informational cascades and of reputation and compensation-based herding.
Disclosure rules, timely provision of data, and better-designed compensation
contracts may make markets and institutions more transparent. And the development
of futures and forward markets may bring information about market expectations
into the public domain. However, in a relatively transparent environment, changes
in the situation of economic units is likely to bring forth similar responses from
many, if not most, profit-maximizing investors, but this behavior would reflect the
reaction to publicly available information in well-functioning markets. Greater
transparency makes it more likely that prices will closely track fundamentals; it does
not necessarily imply that transparency will reduce price volatility.
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